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ABSTRACT 
Purpose. The main interest of this thesis lies in investigating if, and in that case to what extent, 
the fund manager’s skills affect return of private equity funds. 
Methodology. A regression analysis based on performance data of private and public equity is 
undertaken and used to determine the value added through skills provided by fund managers. 
Findings. The results indicate that skills do in fact affect returns in private equity with up to 10% 
annually. In addition, the results show that venture capital funds are more closely linked to the 
performance of the stock market, whereas buyout funds are more affected by the manager’s skills. 
Implications. An important practical implication arising from this study is the suggestion that 
practitioners take skills into account when evaluating the return prospects of various funds. By 
doing so, investors can more easily distinguish between winning and losing funds. 
Contribution. This study contributes to a greater understanding of what drives returns, but also 
tries to fill the knowledge gap on how skills play a driving role. 
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1! Introduction 
The recent turmoil in the macroeconomic environment has required large rescue operations in 
many countries in order to save banks and insurance companies from bankruptcy. To 
jumpstart stalling economies central banks have employed quantitative easing programmes, 
and along with it comes declining interest rates that are now approaching zero (and even 
negative in some countries). These macroeconomic forces urge investors to carefully evaluate 
different alternatives across a range of asset classes before investing. For those looking for a 
high return private equity investments appear to be an attractive alternative with fund 
managers promising returns of 10-20% p.a. through investments with active ownership in 
non-public companies. The magnitude of the potential returns has resulted in a steady annual 
growth of the private equity industry of 10-11% and a total value of private equity and 
venture capital assets under management amounting to $3.8 trillion spread across 2,235 funds 
according to the data provider Preqin’s annual report (2015). Private equity investing has also 
flourished in media, where deals such as the $2.4 billion fundraise for the taxi-service Uber 
has caught investors’ attention. The amounts of capital involved in private equity deals are 
great in themselves, yet as the majority of the investments are highly levered the economic 
impact is even greater than the invested capital suggests (Phalippou and Zollo, 2005a). 
Despite being a major group of financial assets, with exceptional returns as one of the key 
characteristics, there are significant challenges in measuring fund performance. The capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) that often is used to describe the relationship between risk and 
expected return of publicly traded assets relies on a number of assumptions which do not hold 
for privately traded assets, and therefore alternative performance measures, such as internal 
rate of return (IRR) and multiple of invested capital (MOIC) have emerged (Ang and 
Sorenson, 2013). Both these measures are absolute measures of performance, and therefore 
many researchers argue that they do not reflect the true performance. Instead they argue that 
in order to fully capture the true performance of private equity, one must look at the 
performance relative to that of the public equity. The discrepancy in performance measures 
makes it difficult to compare returns in both markets to one another, and consequently, 
researchers have failed to reach consensus regarding the true performance of private equity. 
Some academics argue that it has outperformed public markets by 3% per year on average 
over the life time of the fund (Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan, 2014), whereas others argue that 
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private equity performance is very close to that of the public market (Phalippou, 2011; 
Gottschalg and Phalippou, 2007).  
Before deciding whether to invest in private equity or not, it is important that an investor 
understands what this lack of consensus means to them and how they, if choosing to invest, 
can select the right fund that will maximise returns. To answer this question we must return to 
an underlying assumption of many economic models (including CAPM) – market efficiency. 
In private equity, where there are no requirements to publicly report deals transactions, there 
are often significant information asymmetry, hence the private equity market cannot be 
considered efficient. In fact, for most fund managers the ability to acquire non-public 
information lays the foundation for the fund’s competitive advantage. Consequently, a fund 
manager’s skills come to play a significant role in the acquisition and interpretation of 
information, and thereby also affect the fund’s performance (Anson, 2007). Several 
researchers report evidence for persistence – fund managers with previous experience perform 
better than their more inexperienced peers (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Phalippou and 
Gottschalg, 2009; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2010). With the increasing 
number of funds, and the different investment alternatives thereof, previous research suggests 
that investors may want to take the fund manager’s specific skills and experience into account 
to better differentiate between the attractiveness of various funds. 
The main interest of this thesis therein lies in investigating if, and in that case to what extent, 
the fund manager’s skills affect return. To do so, a regression analysis based on performance 
data of private and public equity is undertaken and used to determine the value added through 
skills that fund managers provide. Private equity data is accessed from Private Equity 
Intelligence Ltd. (Preqin) comprising 20 years of performance data of approximately 6900 
funds located across the world. The results indicate that skills do in fact affect returns in 
private equity with up to 10% annually. In addition, the results show that venture capital 
funds are more closely linked to the performance of the stock market, whereas buyout funds 
are more affected by the manager’s skills.  
The remainder of this thesis discusses the theoretical underpinnings of private equity 
investments and their respective performance, the research methodology employed to conduct 
the study, followed by an analysis of the results of the empirical data collection. The 
limitations and implications of the research are then presented. Finally, the study ends by 
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providing recommendations for private equity investors, as well as researchers, and closes 
with some final conclusions. 
2!Theoretical Framework 
2.1! Private Equity – What Do We Know? 
Private equity has been around as an investment alternative for a long time, but has grown 
remarkably since the 1970s when more favourable tax and regulatory changes were 
introduced (Fenn et al., 1995). The industry has a limited partnership structure, meaning that 
institutional investors serve as limited partners (LPs) and private equity managers as general 
partners (GPs). The general partner has broad discretion to invest on behalf of the limited 
partner, and also to determine the values of the investments. Limited partnerships have been 
found to be the most efficient way to organise private equity investments, as they help tackle 
the “extreme information asymmetry and potential incentive problems that arise in the 
market” (Fenn et al., 1995).  
Because they take an active role in developing the portfolio company, the general partner 
often only manages a few individual investments at the same time (Jones and Rhodes-Kropf, 
2004). A small portfolio reduces the diversification possibilities, and therefore firms tend to 
develop specific investment strategies that allow them to specialise on certain types of 
investments. By doing so they can better manage and control the risks involved, as they gain a 
deeper understanding of the area in which they invest. The two most common strategies are 
buyouts and venture capital, but there are many more. However, as these two strategies 
represent the majority of private equity deals (Preqin, 2015), as well as data being more 
readily available for them, this study will only be concerned with them. Most previous 
research on private equity uses the same rationale, and therefore it seems acceptable to do so 
even here (e.g. Anson, 2007; Phalippou and Zollo, 2005). Appendix I provides an excerpt 
from the data provider’s glossary, with definitions of the two types as well as the sub-
categories within them.  
Once selected which investment strategy to follow, the next choice for the limited partner is 
which of the funds within that category to invest its capital into. There are often hundreds of 
different alternatives, and investors evaluate and compare fund in the hope of selecting the 
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one which will maximise returns. Investors look at different factors that are thought to drive 
returns, yet there is no established industry standard what to look for. Private equity 
professionals often claim that it is their active role and therein direct influence on business 
strategies that drive the high returns in the industry (Wilmes, 2007). There are also several 
academics that have sought to empirically determine such drivers of private equity returns, yet 
few have managed to develop a model with high explanatory power. Phalippou and Zollo 
(2005) regressed returns against bond yield, return on public stock market, length of 
investment, size of the fund and experience of the fund family. The results indicated that these 
variables explain 11% of the variation in fund performance, with experience of the fund 
family as the most important driver. In a similar study, Wilmes (2007) regressed returns 
against vintage year, size of investment, return on the stock market, geographical location, 
and fund type. The author found that only 2.7% of the variation in returns could be explained 
by those variables.   
This study hopes to contribute to this gap of knowledge on performance drivers, but to do so 
we must first understand how return is measured in both private and public equity, and how 
the performance of the two markets are related. 
2.2! Measuring Private and Public Equity Performance 
2.2.1! Private Equity Performance 
There is no industry established rule on how general partners should value and price their 
portfolios. The private nature causes the securities to be illiquid and often requires intensive 
research to determine if they are priced fairly. As such the prices often do not reflect all 
available public information. As already introduced in the former chapter, the lack of market 
efficiency is both a challenge for managers, but also adds to their competitive advantage 
(Anson, 2007). Despite the challenges, there are a few measures that are commonly used in 
industry.  
Internal rate of return (IRR) is the most common performance measure used by practitioners 
and is based on cash flow data of the fund. IRR is the discount rate that makes the present 
value of all cash flows equal to zero (Ellis, Pattni, and Tailor, 2012). IRR is an absolute 
measure, and does not reflect the performance of the fund compared to other asset classes. 
Therefore, some argue that IRR does not reflect the true performance and that we need a 
better measure that is relative to other asset classes, such as public equity.  
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The measure also relies on a number of assumptions that are not always true. For instance, 
IRR implicitly assumes that any cash proceeds have been reinvested at IRR over the entire 
investment period, and this is not always realistic (Gottschalg and Phalippou, 2007). For this 
reason, Long and Nickels (1996) devised a measure called Public Market Equivalent (PME). 
The PME expresses the ratio of “terminal wealth obtained when investing in a private equity 
fund and reinvesting intermediate cash flows in a given public market benchmark compared 
to the terminal wealth obtained when investing the same amount of money in the benchmark.” 
(Diller and Kaserer, 2004). However, some of the issues from IRR remain, such as the 
problem with calculating the values of non-liquidated funds (Wilmes, 2007). Furthermore, 
IRR is relatively easy to manipulate as higher cash flows early in the investment life cycle 
tend to boost IRR, but an equal loss later on will have much smaller negative effect (Singh, 
n.d.). Such limitations have caused a debate in literature whether IRR really is the best 
measure fore private equity performance, despite the improvements offered by the PME 
scholars are searching for a new, more holistic measure. The validity of performance 
measures is a whole separate research topic and, as IRR is still the most commonly reported 
performance indicator used in practice, performance will be measured using IRR in this study. 
This leaves potential for improvements once a better measurement has been developed and 
validated. 
2.2.2! Market Indices 
When comparing the returns of private equity to the public market, the most common method 
is by using market indices (Anson, 2007; Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman, 1993). There are a 
number of different indices that exhibit different characteristics (e.g. S&P 500, Nasdaq and 
Russell 2000). Depending on the fund certain market indices may be more appropriate to use 
as benchmarks. Previous literature has tended to use S&P 500 or Russell 1000 when 
benchmarking buyout funds because of their larger capitalisation, whereas small-cap indices 
such as Russell 2000 are used for Venture Capital (Anson, 2007; Coggin, Fabozzi, and 
Rahman, 1993; Ellis, Pattni, and Tailor, 2012). However, these studies do not test if these 
selections are appropriate for their data, meaning that there is no clear evidence in literature 
that this is the preferred way. Furthermore, Gottschalg, Talmor, and Vasvari (2010) suggests 
that it may be more appropriate to construct a specific and more representative index based on 
the industry mixes of the public market rather than using a published index as a whole. For 
simplicity, however, I use four published indices to represent the public market return. I then 
seek to test whether there is any preferred index for each type of fund, as well as for the 
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categories within them. Hence, in this aspect this study will contribute to closing this 
knowledge gap in literature and encourage future researchers to make more informed 
decisions regarding which index appropriate for different types of funds. 
2.2.3! The Private-Public Equity Return Relationship 
Many investors invest heavily in private equity for portfolio diversification purposes, 
believing that private equity returns are not correlated to the public market. Studies report 
evidence of large institutional investors believing that private equity funds can “generate 
incremental returns independent of how the broader markets were performing” (Lerner, 
Hardymon, and Leamon, 2004). Yet researchers have found that the performance of private 
equity fund are in fact strongly correlated to the public market in a pro-cyclical manner, 
positively co-varying with both business cycles and the stock markets (Phalippou and Zollo, 
2005b; Robinson and Sensoy, 2011; Sommer, 2012). The current performance measures of 
private equity are often sufficient for comparing assets within private equity, yet the 
difficulties in marking private equity portfolios make it inherently difficult to compare the 
returns to those of other asset classes. Consequently, the results from previous studies of the 
relationship between private and public equity are somewhat ambiguous and researchers have 
failed to reach a clear consensus regarding whether the private equity market outperform the 
public market or not. However, from the observations made during the research for this study, 
it seems as if the majority of researchers argue for an outperformance of private equity 
compared to public equity (Harris et al., 2013; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Ellis, Pattni, and 
Tailor, 2012; Ang and Sorenson, 2013). With literature supporting no apparent driver for this 
outperformance, the question that arises is whether it may be the skills of the general partner 
and its team or if it is it simply down to luck? 
2.3! Skills or Pure Luck? 
The specific characteristics of the private equity market suggests that the skills of the fund 
manager and its team could have more significant effect on fund performance than is the case 
for investments in public equity. In fact, there is no clear evidence in literature that mutual 
fund performance may be driven by the manager’s skills (Kaserer and Diller, 2007) and 
therefore an investor’s investment strategy should not depend on the track record of the team 
itself. For reasons introduced in the former chapter of this thesis, knowledge and information 
about investment opportunities is considered as competitive advantage for fund managers in 
private equity (Anson, 2007). Therefore, we would expect the fund manager’s skills to 
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acquire and behold such information as much more important in private equity than in public 
funds.  
If true that manager skills do affect fund returns and that skills are unequally distributed, there 
is a systematic difference in knowledge and information about investment opportunities 
amongst private equity managers. Inherently we would expect the good private equity deals to 
be concentrated to a smaller number of skilled fund managers. If so is the case, private equity 
returns should have much more skewed distribution than those of the public equity market 
and Kaserer and Diller (2007) do in fact show evidence of such a skewness. Following the 
suggestion that skills are unequally distributed amongst managers, the authors also argue that 
this distribution may not be independent over time, and that we therefore may find 
correlations between the returns of subsequent funds run by the same manager. In literature 
this phenomenon is referred to as persistence, and is supported by many scholars (e.g. 
Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Gottschalg et al., 2004). In their 
study Kaserer and Diller (2007) classified funds as winners or losers, and using the 
contingency table methodology they found that the majority of funds remain within their 
categorical status throughout the lifetime of the fund. Their results show that only 18% of 
follow-on funds is a winner if the preceding fund was a loser, when managed by the same GP.  
Based on the argument that skills may have a significant effect on fund return, persistence 
give rise to a practical implication that is valuable for investors when deciding on their 
strategy: “never change a winning team” (Kaserer and Diller, 2007) Consequently, it would 
make good sense to consider the track record of skills and experience of the fund manager 
when selecting which fund to invest in. For this reason, there is often high demand for 
successful fund managers and they are therefore often granted the luxury of choosing its 
investors themselves. In order for investors to get around this issue, Kaserer and Diller 
suggest to identify successful managers and their teams at the start of their GP career and 
thereafter stick to that winning team. However, the authors do not suggest how this 
identification or selection is to be made, but rather seek to pinpoint the importance of the 
relationship between manager skills and fund return. 
Certain previous studies have included skill, or more correctly, experience in their analyses of 
performance drivers in private equity and found that it has had a significant effect on return, 
yet sometimes a marginal one (Phalippou and Zollo, 2005; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; 
Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). The studies have used a number of different measures of 
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experience – number of years in the industry, number of funds managed etc. – but I argue that 
the number of years or the number of funds run does not necessarily translate into skills and 
therefore they fail to capture the true skill of the general partner in their studies. Skills is a 
very subjective concept and can be expressed in different ways, and thereby including it in a 
regression analysis as a number is a very simplified truth.  
There are some researchers that have tried to overcome this issue, and suggest that the skills 
added by the private equity fund manager is the excess return received when compared to the 
public market (Anson, 2007; Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman, 1993; Jensen, 1968; Jensen, 
1969). This inherently means that there are no other factors, e.g. industry, size and location, 
that drive returns, but only the general partner’s skills. In fact, the same (or at least very 
similar) industry, size and location can be targeted when investing in public equity, so it 
should not drive returns on the market. However, the time, expertise and commitment of the 
fund manager is not something that investors obtain when investing in the public stock market 
and, as such, this may give rise to a difference in returns. Hence, by assuming that the 
variation in skills provided by the general partner is the principal difference between the two 
equity markets’ returns, there is no need to quantify skills as the number of years or similar. 
Instead, this measure captures aspects of skills that otherwise are very difficult to quantify, 
such as ability to select the appropriate portfolio and timings of investments.  
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3!Research Methodology and Data 
This chapter seeks to justify the use of methods for data sampling, analysis and interpretation. 
The chapter commences by outlining the research design that underpins this study after which 
the data set is accounted for, including the choice of data provider. The methodology further 
encompasses the selected methodology for data analysis.  
3.1! Research Design 
To address the question “to what extent does a fund manager’s skill affect private equity 
performance?” one has to decide between two alternative research approaches. First, through 
case studies, surveys and interviews with private equity firms and their limited partners one 
could investigate the drivers of fund performance, and the role played by skills and 
experience, in a qualitative research design. Second, using a quantitative research design, fund 
performance could be studied through time-series analysis of performance data. According to 
Punch (2005, p. 235), qualitative research is more favourable for theory generation in areas of 
research which are relatively immature, whereas quantitative research is favourable for 
research in areas in which initial hypotheses are awaiting validation. Although private equity 
as a research field is relatively young, initial hypotheses have been formulated regarding the 
effects of the manager’s skills on fund performance and therefore a quantitative approach is 
taken in this study. Another argument for choosing a quantitative approach is that asking fund 
managers to report their own skills may result in significant deviations from their true skills, 
as some managers may understate and others overstate their abilities. 
Furthermore, inherent in any research design is a trade-off between internal and external 
validity of the study (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 149). Internal validity reflects on the 
causality of the study’s conclusions, i.e. in which direction the effects of performance 
characteristics are moving, whereas external validity is concerned with the extent to which the 
results of a study can be generalised (Gibbert, Rugirok, and Wicki, 2008). At the expense of 
internal validity, I favour external validity in this study by studying a large set of cross-
sectional fund performance data. Regression analysis is an appropriate tool to investigate the 
correlation between two or more variables (Hair, Black, Babin, and Andersson, 2009), yet by 
using cross-sectional data the regression model alone cannot explain the cause-effect 
relationship (Gujarati and Porter, 2009, p. 22). However, the fact that other researchers have 
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found evidence of persistence, suggesting that it is the skills that affect performance and not 
the other way around, reduces these limitations. In fact, the objective of this research is not to 
quantify the effects of fund managers’ skills on performance over time, but rather to 
investigate the relationship at a set point in time. Hence, a cross-sectional study is justified 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
3.2! Data  
The data used in this study is a compilation of data from several independent sources. On the 
one hand, a commercial database for private equity data has been used. On the other hand, 
public databases comprising of stock market performance was consulted. 
3.2.1! Private Equity Data 
Data availability is one of the largest challenges in private equity research, and it arises for 
two main reasons: the lack of legal obligation to disclose information regarding private equity 
deals (McCahery and Vermeulen, 2010) and the deal confidentiality kept by the funds’ 
general and limited partners. As previously discussed, this data limitation causes several 
challenges when measuring private equity performance. Nonetheless, there are standard 
industry practices for performance reporting, and this research draws upon these pre-defined 
performance measures to map the relationship between skills and private equity performance. 
There are also discrepancies in data availability between different geographical regions, 
largely due to differences in maturity of the private equity industry across the world. Private 
equity as an industry has enjoyed significant growth globally since the 1970s, yet the United 
States have historically served as headquarters for the majority of funds. Nevertheless, as the 
industry has progressed over recent years, databases have come to incorporate European 
funds to a larger extent, reducing the implications of this issue (Strömberg, 2009, p. 2).  
The set of private equity data on which this study is based is provided by Private Equity 
Intelligence Ltd. (Preqin). Preqin is one of the largest private equity data providers globally, 
and is used by industry professionals. The database was accessed July 31 2015, serving as the 
reference date for this study, at which point in time it contained information about 6923 
funds. However, this study only looks at buyout and venture capital funds, funds with other 
strategies were neglected. This resulted in a dataset of 2896 funds, with vintage year 1980 or 
later and ranging between $100 million and $6 billion in managed assets. The performance 
characteristics of the dataset is an average fund reporting an annual return (IRR) of 14.0% 
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(median of 12.7%). The best performing fund reported a return of 65.0%, in comparison to 
the worst performing fund at -18.7%. However, there were instances of incomplete data for a 
number of funds and therefore 204 funds were excluded from the study. The final data set 
comprised of 2692 funds with vintage years from 1992 to date. The performance 
characteristics increased slightly from the initial data set, with average return being 15.2% 
(median of 13.6%) and best and worst observations remaining unchanged. As seen in Figure 
1, the data set shows that returns are slightly skewed (1.34), and also characterised by a 
kurtosis of 3.17. The skewness of four public return indices ranges between -.95 to.27, 
indicating that our data supports Kaserer and Diller’s (2007) suggestion that private equity 
returns are more skewed than public ones due to the higher importance of the manager’s 
skills.  
 
Figure 1: Return Distribution of Private Equity Funds 
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The database contained a range of different data, but the information withdrawn for the 
purpose of this study was: vintage year, fund size, strategy, and net IRR. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of number of funds and the respective return for each strategy, based on the final 
dataset employed in this study. Venture Capital is split into three sub-categories depending on 
when in the company’s life-cycle the investments are made. Buyout is categorised according 
to the size of the investment. For further definitions of each fund type and their sub-
categories, please refer to Appendix I. 
Table 1: Distribution of Data Across Investment Strategies 
Strategy  Number of funds Average weighted return (p.a.) 
Buyout 1187 16.2% 
 Small 573 17.5% 
 Medium 360 16.6% 
 Large 180 16.7% 
 Mega 74 9.2% 
Venture Capital 1605 13.62% 
 Early Stage 326 13.1% 
 Growth 68 13.1% 
 Late Stage 1211 14.0% 
Total  2692 15.2% 
 
A problem in private equity research is the risk for selection bias that, in turn, arises due to 
survivorship bias – the better performing funds are more likely to be reported than the poor 
performing ones. This is an inherent risk when using the database, but Preqin assures that they 
gather their data from several different sources and thereby reduce this possibility. However, 
the private nature of the database does not allow for scrutiny of this claim and therefore this 
risk is inherent in the study. 
3.2.2! Public Equity Data 
A challenge in measuring true private equity performance is determining the appropriate 
benchmark against which private equity performance is to be compared. Different investment 
strategies link the returns more closely to certain sectors of the the public market. For 
instance, the returns to venture capital exhibit a close link to the OTC stock market and 
therefore it may be more appropriate to benchmark it against the Nasdaq index (Anson, 2007). 
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On the other hand, leveraged buyouts involve private established companies that often suffer 
from inefficiencies in one form or the other. These companies are relatively mature, and as 
such a stock market index with larger capitalisation may be more appropriate as benchmark.  
To account for the difference in investment strategies between buyouts and venture capital, 
along with their respective sub-strategies, four stock market indices are used as benchmarks in 
this study. These are:  
-! S&P 500: Tracks the performance of the 500 largest U.S. players on the stock market. 
It is a broad equity market index with larger capitalised stocks. 
-! Nasdaq: Tracks the performance of the roughly 3000 companies traded on the Nasdaq 
exchange. Most companies are very innovative and within the tech-sector, making it 
an appropriate public benchmark for Venture Capital performance.  
-! Russell 2000: Tracks the performance of the 2000 smallest companies on the stock 
market. Appropriate for smaller capitalised stocks. 
-! Russell 1000: Tracks the performance of the 1000 largest companies on the stock 
market. It is a broad equity market index with larger capitalised stocks. 
The annual historical index data from 1992 to date was obtained via each index provider. 
3.3! Data Analysis 
To determine the effect of skills on private equity return, a simple one period, one factor 
regression model was employed. This data analysis draws upon a model suggested by Anson 
(2007), which seeks to capture the true return added by a manager’s skills. Anson argues that 
the only way to capture the true skill that is actually reflected in the returns of the investment 
is by “regressing the returns of the private equity investment on the concurrent returns of a 
broad-market index”. In his model, the market index serves as a proxy for market risk, and the 
output of the regression then ultimately reveals to what extent the return is due to market 
exposure and what is contributed by the manager’s skills. The regression takes the form of: !",$ %& =(∝ (+(+!,,$ +(-",$(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((1) 
which can easily be rearranged to produce a new equation: !",$ %& − (+!,,$ =(∝ (+(-",$(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((2) 
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where !",$ %& ((represents the annual return, net of fees, to private equity investments at time t. !,,$ represents the annual return on a broad-based market index at time t. +(is a measure of the systematic exposure of PE returns to the market index. ∝ is the excess return earned by private equity manager; the manager’s skills. -",$ is the residual term, measuring variation in returns that are not explained by the data. 
Now, Anson (2007) argues that in order to demonstrate an active skill, α, the manager must 
earn a risk-adjusted return in excess of the risk-free return he or she would obtain by investing 
in government bonds. The underlying reason for this is that if the manager is unable to find an 
attractive investment, he or she should at least invest the capital in a safe, short-term asset, 
such as the U.S. Treasury bills. We therefore adjust Equation (2) to take into account this risk-
free return and receive at the final model used to analyse the data, together with the 
explanation of the variables: [!",$ %& − 45677] − (+[!,,$ − 45677] =(∝ (+(-",$((((((((((((((((((((((((3) 
where [!",$ %& − 45677]((represents the annual risk-adjusted return, net of fees, earned by private 
equity at time t. [!,,$ − 45677] represents the annual risk-adjusted return on the market at time t. ∝ is the risk-adjusted excess return earned by private equity manager; the manager’s skills. -",$ is the residual effects that are not explained by the data. 
In the regression analysis, return to the private equity fund is the dependent variable, and the 
return to the market index is the independent variable. The β-coefficient reveals the how 
sensitive the private equity investment is to movements in the broader stock market: if β>1 
the private equity portfolio is more sensitive to movements in the stock market than a 
diversified stock basket, if β<1 the portfolio is less sensitive to movements in the overall 
stock market. The regression contains one intercept, α, and one residual term, ε. Whether the 
intercept of the regression should be considered as the fund manager’s skill, or if it should be 
considered as other factors affecting returns, is determined by its significance. If the term is 
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statistically significant, the it indicates that it has a consistent economic effect, the manager’s 
skills α, whereas if it is not, it represents random noise. 
To determine which market index is most appropriate for each private equity type – buyout 
and venture capital, including their sub-categories – the regression is run for each type and 
category. The result is therefore nine different regression outputs. Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse the 2692 observations.   
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4!Results and Analysis 
This section presents the results and analyses of using Equation (3) as the regression model. 
4.1! Leveraged Buyouts 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the complete sample of buyout funds, with the 
different sub-category in each of the panels. Panel A shows the results for all buyout funds. 
The annual returns to buyouts were regressed against the annual returns to S&P 500, Nasdaq, 
Russell 1000, and Russell 2000 over the period 1992-2012. In all cases the β-coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and so is the α-intercept. Hence the data shows 
evidence that venture capitalists add value beyond that of the public market return. For 
instance, the α-value of 8.96 for the Russell 2000 regression implies that, on average, the 
returns to venture capital generated a risk-adjusted return in excess of a Treasury bill of 
8.96% per year. This means that the manager’s skills account for almost 9% of the IRR, 
which is a considerable amount. The significant β-coefficients also demonstrate that the 
returns to buyouts are dependent on the performance of the stock market. This is could be 
expected, as a strong stock market generally indicates favourable conditions for a public 
offering. We should note that the regressions generated relatively low R-square measures2, 
ranging from 13% to 27%. This implies that, for instance for the Nasdaq, 27% of the variation 
in IRR is explained by the market index. The R-squared also indicates which market index 
that is most appropriate for benchmarking the data, and the results indicate that, in general, 
Russell 2000 is the most appropriate for benchmarking against buyouts.  
Panel B-E in Table 2 reports the results from the regressions of each sub-category within 
buyouts. Interestingly, the α-intercept is statistically significant at the 1% level for small, 
medium and large buyout funds, suggesting that the manager’s skills do affect the return of 
the fund. It does not appear to have a significant effect on the mega-sized funds, however, and 
one explanation for this is that the companies are too big for the manager to have an impact. 
This explanation is supported by the data, as the manager’s skills have greatest effects on 
small buyout funds, where it reaches up to 10.33% for the Russell 1000 index. The β-
coefficients for small and medium funds are all significant, some at the 5%-level but the 
                                               
2 Harrel (2001) suggests that R-squared should range between .4-.6 for the model to have an 
acceptable fit. 
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majority at the 1% level. This indicates that the returns to buyout funds of these sizes are 
dependent on the performance of the stock market. Yet, large and mega-sized funds show no 
significant dependency on the stock market (with the exception of Russell 2000), perhaps 
because they are large enough to affect the market themselves.  
Table 2: Regression Results for Buyout Funds 
 
In general, we observe smaller α as the size of the buyout increases. This indicates that 
smaller funds are more guided by manager skills than by market performance. We can also 
make an interesting observation that Russell 2000 generates the largest R-square, regardless 
of size. This goes against what previous literature argues, that smaller funds should be 
benchmarked against small-cap indices like Russell 2000 and larger funds should be 
Panel Market Index α β R2 
 S&P 500 8.73** .23** .15 
A: All Nasdaq 8.54** .14** .13 
 Russell 1000 8.58** .23** .17 
 Russell 2000 8.96** .31** .27 
 S&P 500 10.18** .24** .17 
B: Small Nasdaq 10.02** .15** .16 
 Russell 1000 10.33** .25** .18 
 Russell 2000 10.10** .29** .27 
 S&P 500 9.60** .28* .17 
C: Medium Nasdaq 9.44** .15* .14 
 Russell 1000 8.56** .27** .22 
 Russell 2000 9.56** .34** .27 
 S&P 500 8.45** .17 .09 
D: Large Nasdaq 8.36** .10 .06 
 Russell 1000 8.59** .19 .11 
 Russell 2000 9.07** .29* .23 
 S&P 500 .92 .12 .16 
E: Mega Nasdaq .66 .08 .20 
 Russell 1000 .38 .11 .17 
 Russell 2000 2.09 .21* .47 
Notes: The table reports β (unstandardized coefficients), R2, and significance levels *p<.05, and **p<.01. 
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benchmarked against large-cap indices like S&P 500. However, it is worth taking into 
account that the data contains many more observations of small funds than of large funds and 
that this could potentially give rise to this issue. If there would be similar number of 
observations for each fund size, this might be adjusted for. 
4.2! Venture Capital 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the complete sample of venture capital funds, with 
the different sub-category represented in Panels A-D. Panel A represents the results for the 
complete sample of venture capital funds. The annual returns to venture capital were 
regressed in the same manner as for the buyout funds. In all cases the β-coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and so is the α-intercept. Hence the data shows 
evidence that venture capitalists add value beyond that of the public market return. The 
significant β-coefficients also demonstrate that the returns to venture capital are dependent on 
the performance of the stock market. This could be expected, as a strong stock market 
generally indicates a healthy IPO market, which in turn translates into good returns for the 
venture capitalists. We should note that the regressions generated relatively low R-square 
measures, ranging from 21% to 32%. This implies that, for instance for the S&P 500, 32% of 
the variation in IRR is explained by the market index. The R-squared also indicate that, in 
general, the S&P 500 and Russell 1000 are the most appropriate for benchmarking venture 
capital funds. 
Comparing venture capital to buyout funds, we observe that the β-coefficients in Table 7 are 
higher than those for buyouts in Table 2. This indicates that venture capital funds are more 
sensitive to the returns to the stock market. The α-levels are much higher for buyouts, 
indicating that manager’s skills are more important for buyout funds than for venture capital. 
The results offer no clear picture of which benchmark is most appropriate in general for the 
respective strategies. 
Panels B-D in Table 3 report the results from the regressions of each sub-category within 
venture capital. Interestingly, the α-intercept is not statistically significant for early stage 
venture capital, suggesting that the manager’s skills do not affect the return of the fund. This 
is somewhat surprising, as one might expect it to be more important at the early stage of a 
company’s life-cycle. Yet a logical explanation is that, as early stage companies are strapped 
for cash, the provided capital is relatively more important than skills to get the company 
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going. As soon as the company is off the ground and enters growth and late stage, the 
manager’s skills come to have an effect on return, as demonstrated by the α-intercept that are 
significant at a 5% level. Values are particularly high for growth funds, implying that when a 
skilled manager can help form strategies and expansion plans, their effect on return is the 
highest. 
The β-coefficients are all significant, some at the 5%-level but the majority at the 1% level. 
This indicates that the returns to venture capital are dependent on the performance of the 
stock market, regardless during which part of the life-cycle the investment is made. R-square 
increases for both early stage and growth, indicating that they are more closely linked to the 
public markets than late stage venture capital. This is surprising, as one would assume that the 
closer the company is to IPO, the more affected it would be by the stock markets. Yet the 
results state the opposite.  
Table 3: Regression Results for Early, Growth and Late Stage Venture Capital 
 Market Index α β R2 
 S&P 500 6.02** .42** .32 
A: All Nasdaq 5.86** .22** .21 
 Russell 1000 6.61** .42** .32 
 Russell 2000 6.30** .34** .22 
B: Early Stage 
S&P 500 5.41 .51** .46 
Nasdaq 5.39 .23* .24 
Russell 1000 6.26 .50** .44 
Russell 2000 5.80 .40** .29 
C: Growth Stage 
S&P 500 6.83* .31* .69 
Nasdaq 6.51* .26* .68 
Russell 1000 7.33* .31** .71 
Russell 2000 6.63* .32** .75 
D: Late Stage 
S&P 500 6.07* .40** .25 
Nasdaq 5.95* .21** .17 
Russell 1000 6.56* .41** .26 
Russell 2000 6.44* .32* .16 
Notes: The table reports β (unstandardized coefficients), R2, and significance levels *p<.05, and **p<.01. 
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5!Discussion 
5.1! Implications 
A number of implications arise from the analysis of the regression. Firstly, the results show 
that manager skills do have a significant impact on return to private equity and therefore it is 
suggested that practitioners take skills into account when evaluating the return prospects of 
various funds. In practice, this may be more difficult said than done as skills are subjective, 
and sometime also not visible for all to see. However, investors are recommended to look at 
factors such as number of previous funds, years in the private equity industry and 
performance of previous funds to create their own composite measure of a manager’s skills. 
Secondly, the results from the regression are in some cases ambiguous with respect to 
previous literature regarding which market index is more appropriate for which fund type. 
This leaves a gap in the theory that should be filled in order to better be able to compare 
private and public equity performance.  
Furthermore, this research has contributed to a broad stream of research in Economics and 
Finance, seeking to understand the covariance of returns across different asset classes. The 
regression analysis performed here resulted in much higher R-squared values than previous 
studies seeking to explain drivers of private equity returns, hence indicating that the model 
fits the data better. Thereby, this study has contributed to a greater understanding of what 
drives returns, but also tries to fill the knowledge gap on how skills play a driving role. 
5.2! Limitations 
When performing regression analyses, the results are only as good as the data. The data used 
in this study is restricted to buyout and venture capital funds, and therefore the results cannot 
be generalised to the entire private equity industry as such. However, together these two types 
of funds represent the majority of all funds and therefore it is reasonable to assume it provides 
a good indication of the general market. In addition, the dataset employed in this study is 
provided by Preqin, and any biases in their data gathering process or reporting are therefore 
inherent in this study.    
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5.3! Further Research 
Studies have found that the returns of private equity funds follow the stock markets, but some 
results also indicate that there is a lag between stock market performance and private equity 
performance (Sommer, 2012; Robinson and Sensoy, 2012). Therefore, it is suggested to run a 
multiple period regression on the same data set to see if this changes the effects of skills on 
returns. Furthermore, as this research has found that manager’s skills have a significant 
positive effect on returns, a further advancement could be to try to understand and empirically 
test for different aspects of skills. Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993) make an attempt to 
quantify the effects of the skill of timing of investments and that of portfolio selection, but 
their model could potentially be extended to include more variables. In general, performing 
the same study with an increased level of data is likely to enhance the results. 
6!Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of the general partner’s skills on private 
equity returns. The study uses a regression model in which the private equity return is 
compared to the return to public market indices in order to generate the excess risk-adjusted 
return earned by the manager. Using data provided by Private Equity Intelligence Ltd. the 
analysis was done on 2692 buyout and venture capital funds from 1992-2012.  
The results of the the analysis showed that the skills of the fund manager do have a significant 
positive effect on returns, both for buyout and venture capital funds, but the effects were 
found to be stronger for buyout funds. The results also indicate that venture capital firms are 
more closely linked to the stock market indices and are more sensitive to movements on the 
public market than are buyout funds. Finally, the analysis concludes that there is no preferred 
market index to benchmark buyout and venture capital funds against, as previous literature 
indicates.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Definition of Fund Types 
The following definitions are cited from Private Equity Intelligence Ltd. (Preqin)’s database. 
Buyout: “Buyout funds enable the current operating management and investors to acquire or 
to purchase a significant shareholding in the product line or business they manage. The 
financial sponsor usually gains control of a majority of a target company’s equity through the 
use of borrowed money or debt.” 
 Small: ≤ $500 million in managed assets. 
 Medium: $501-$1,500 million in managed assets. 
 Large: $1,501 million -4.5 billion in managed assets. 
 Mega: >4.5 billion in managed assets. 
Venture Capital: “Venture Capital is a type of private equity investment that provides capital 
to new or growing businesses. Venture funds invest in start-up firms an small businesses with 
perceived, long-term growth potential.” 
Early Stage: “A type of venture investment but that invest only in the early stage of a 
company life.” 
Growth: “Funds aiming to grow and expand an established company.  
Late Stage: “Venture Capital investments in more mature companies. 
 
